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For more than ten years now, the term »synthetic biology« (synbio for short) 
refers to research projects, methods and procedures dealing with the »redesign 
of natural organisms« that goes far beyond what has been possible so far by 
»traditional« genetic engineering. The approaches involved are envisioned to 
ultimately give rise to the creation of (completely) artificial »biological« systems. 
The significance in the short and medium term as well as the longer-term 
potential of this very heterogeneous field are assessed quite differently by actors 
from science, economy and politics which is also due to the fact that a stringent 
definition is still missing. Nevertheless, such a stringent definition would be 
indispensable for a differentiated examination of the possible consequences 
involved. So far, none of the many bodies that have made an attempt has 
succeeded in to define a scientifically reasonable demarcation to genetic 
engineering that is also (easily) understandable to non-experts. Thus, it is not 
surprising that – despite sporadic media coverage – the subject has hardly 
reached society's awareness yet. 
In the TAB report, a basic differentiation is made between synbio in the 
narrow sense and synbio in the broad sense which is used for impact analysis 
and the associated debate: 
› Synbio in the narrow sense refers to the production of cells or organisms 
developed from scratch and designed »de novo« (or of cell-free biological or 
biochemical systems). These organisms are intended for the production of 
any, even completely novel substances or visionary applications in the fields 
of health, energy or the environment. In this context, the production of 
entire synthetic genomes, the construction of so-called »minimal cells« 
(either »top down« by reducing natural cells or »bottom up« or »from 
scratch« from basic biochemical components) as well as the use of non-
natural molecules (»xenobiology«) are characteristic research approaches 
and methods. Synbio in the narrow sense is promoted by a rather small 
number of scientists and shall also provide knowledge on the emergence of 
life (and its chemistry) on Earth. 
› In contrast, synbio in the broad sense refers to all currently pursued 
approaches regarding the molecular-biological modification of known 
organisms which are mostly application-oriented and increasingly based on 
digital information. These approaches aim at producing chemicals by 
means of new ways of bio-synthesis or at designing genetic circuits for new 
sensory and regulatory cell functions in existing organisms. Synbio in the 
broad sense goes beyond simple approaches for genetically modifying 
metabolic pathways of organisms (so-called metabolic engineering). For 
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this, computer-assisted design and modelling processes are used 
increasingly. 
From the perspective of the present investigation, synbio in the broad sense also 
includes genome editing techniques which have not been dealt with under the 
label »synbio« so far. In spring 2015, the rapid development of these techniques 
as well as their application in plants, animals and even humans sparked an 
intensified debate on genetic engineering both at the national and international 
level – that will also involve synbio as a research area and funding object. 
Mission and focus of the study 1.1 
The project of the Office of Technology Assessment at the German Bundestag 
(TAB) was commissioned by the Committee on Education, Research and 
Technology Assessment (»ABFTA«) and started in spring 2011. Besides 
adressing natural-scientific and technological aspects, the project was intended 
to particularly focus on issues regarding ethics, biosafety and biosecurity, 
intellectual property, regulation (or governance), public perception as well as on 
an adequate and early communication of the opportunities and risks involved. 
In the course of the project and in view of TAB's primary task of advising the 
German Bundestag, the following project design has been chosen: 
› The question regarding the nature of synbio shall not be dealt with too 
academically; 
› No in-depth presentation of primarily speculative visions or scenarios of 
future applications and impacts of synbio; 
› Instead: aligning as comprehensively as possible the debates on potentials 
and perspectives of synbio with wider contexts of science, research and 
innovation policies – 
› With the objective to work out and characterize major topics and fields of 
action – which are interconnected and relevant for the future – to be 
pursued by the German Bundestag and particularly by the »ABFTA«. 
This results in the following main chapters of the report: current state of 
research, development and application (chapter III) safety issues of synthetic 
biology (chapter IV), public discourse as a governance perspective of synbio 
(chapter V), actors and perspectives of DIY bio(techno)logy (chapter VI) as well 
as future issues and fields of action (chapter VII). 
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Current state of research, development 
and application 2. 
Many research and development approaches of synbio focus on the use of 
renewable instead of fossil raw materials in chemical and energy production, 
and thus on the core notion of a (future) »bioeconomy«. Furthermore, there are 
potential applications in medicine as well as in the field of environmental 
sensing and remediation. The objective of all these approaches is to use synbio 
in order to overcome, or at least extend, some of the limitations inherent in 
biological processes. 
Chemical and energy production 2.1 
Meanwhile, a whole series of new bio-based production processes for chemical 
substances has been successfully established on a laboratory scale by means of 
synbio in the broad sense. For this, genes from various organisms typically are 
combined and the native genes of the recipient organism are optimized. 
Particularly high-value ingredients (including flavouring substances and 
fragrances) for the food, cosmetics and detergents industry are increasingly 
produced this way. In some cases – at least on a pre-commercial scale – such 
new production processes are also used to synthesize important basic chemicals 
for the production of plastics (1,3-Propanediol, 1,4-Butanediol, or to generate 
biodegradable polymers (polylactides, polyhydroxyalkanoates). 
The production of 1,4-Butanediol by means of Escherichia coli strains 
represents an exemplary step towards synbio in the narrow sense: 1,4-
Butanediol is a non-natural chemical which is not produced by any known 
organism. Thus, its »bio-based« production requires a biosynthesis pathway 
without having any »natural« model. The corresponding biosynthesis pathway 
has been modeled 'in silico' based on knowledge about metabolic pathways and 
enzymatic activities of E. coli and several other organisms, and thus has been 
»rationally designed« to a large extent. 
In the energy sector, approaches of synbio for modifying metabolic 
pathways are mainly used in micro-organisms (such as yeasts or micro-algae) 
aiming at optimizing or redesigning the provision of raw materials (i. a. for the 
production of butanol, biodiesel and farnesenes). With regard to the conversion 
of raw materials, efforts focus on the use of lignocellulosic biomass – the 
material which represents the largest part of plant biomass and which is not 
edible (e. g. corn stalks and leaves) – in order to avoid direct competition with 
food production and, at the same time, to tap a source of raw materials which is 




Synthetic biology offers a number of approaches for innovative therapeutic 
strategies as well as for novel development and production processes for 
pharmaceuticals and vaccines. For diagnostics as well, there are first examples 
for potential applications, e. g. a biosensor intended for detecting the Ebola virus 
for which a cell-free system with a genetic circuit has been developed. While 
most of these approaches are still in early, pre-clinical phases of research, some 
procedures have already reached the stage of clinical trials, large-scale field 
experiments or even commercial production. This includes modified viruses for 
combating cancer, genetically modified mosquitoes for controlling dengue 
fever, as well as the production of the phytochemical artemisinin, as an 
important ingredient of anti-malarial drugs, based on micro-organisms with 
newly designed metabolic pathways. 
Biosensing and bioremediation 2.3 
As cell-based biosensors, genetically modified micro-organisms (GMMO) can 
allow an easy and cost-effective measurement of toxic substances in soil or water 
samples. A first commercially available product (not requiring any release of 
GMMO) is the ARSOlux biosensor for determining the arsenic content in 
drinking water. For the remediation of contaminated soils by means of GMMO, 
however, no approaches are known that are ready for application. 
Environmental release is likely to be a prerequisite for many applications and 
the effective control of the GMMO can hardly be envisioned. Moreover, well-
adapted natural micro-organisms or consortia of micro-organisms exist for the 
removal of major contamination by organic substances (as e. g. oil). 
Overall assessment 2.4 
Altogether, it can be summarized that the state of development and application 
of synbio is still at an early stage and that a future superiority and economic 
viability of synbio approaches cannot be seriously assessed yet. The latter 
particularly applies to potential applications of synbio in the narrow sense which 
today still have a mere visionary character. Currently, it is not possible to predict 
whether (more or less completely) artificial organisms or »bio-like« systems will 




Likewise, methods and procedures of synbio in the broad sense have to 
prevail against other options already existing or also being at the development 
stage. Some projects and products are already competitive today, but those are 
rather low-volume, but high-value products (specialty chemicals, flavouring 
substances, pharmaceuticals and vaccines). For these, neither cost nor biosafety 
issues are playing a major role, because existing or alternative procedures are 
complex as well; and because either production processes are restricted to 
contained systems (bioreactors) or unintended side effects and risks are 
accepted more readily (pharmaceuticals/therapeutics). It should not be ignored 
that particularly those product examples of synbio which are most discussed – 
artemisinin as an anti-malarial drug, vanillin as flavouring substance produced 
by means of modified yeast cells as well as a palm oil substitute made of micro-
algae – are not that »far away« from »conventional« applications of genetic 
engineering. 
Earlier forecasts have seen the greatest potential of synbio in the production 
of bulk chemicals and in energy production. This was supported by the fact that 
several entrepreneurial activities as well as massive investments have been 
observed worldwide and mainly in the bioenergy sector – but have been 
significantly reduced recently as a consequence of the fluctuating and overall 
decreasing oil price development. Both in the field of bulk chemicals and in the 
energy and fuel sector, it has to be considered that these are mass markets in 
which new procedures have to prevail against cost-optimized technologies often 
established for decades. How slow this process can be (at least so far) is shown 
by the example of industrial or »white« biotechnology, i. e. the technology 
preceding synbio. Its share of the production of (bulk) chemicals has developed 
only slowly during the past 25 years. The assessment of ecological and biosafety 
issues as a criterion for the superiority and competitiveness of new production 
systems is gaining more and more importance. Thus, in particular with regard 
to biofuel production by means of genetically optimized micro-algae, the 
question is whether these micro-algae would have to be cultivated on a large 
scale in (semi-)open water basins (for economic reasons) or whether – and to 
what extent – contained systems (combined with continuous production 
processes) could be used. 
The future development of synbio will strongly depend on the commitment 
of public and private investors. Their motivations, however, are quite 
heterogeneous. While public research funding focuses (or should focus) on 
sustainability issues, industry primarily wants to secure the future basis of their 
business. Despite of the recent decline of the oil price, it has to be assumed that 
these objectives – in the years to come – will converge more and more towards 
an economic approach based on renewable and environmentally friendly raw 
materials (in terms of a bio-economy). Although, there will not necessarily be a 
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consensus regarding the preferable approaches with regard to this bio-economy, 
this common objective, however, generally is an argument in favour of the great 
potential of all bio-based production strategies. Most likely, at least from a 
global point of view, the question in the long term is not whether or not synbio 
shall be used in general. It is about reaching a »competitive coexistence« with 
alternative procedures aiming at an intelligent use of the existing biological 
diversity and its inherent properties (e. g. in terms of a knowledge-intensive 
agroecology) – similar to the way both organic and conventional agriculture are 
practiced today. 
It is even less possible to assess the prospects of success of therapeutics, 
vaccines and gene therapy approaches in a generalizing way. Particularly with 
regard to medicine, the effectiveness and relative superiority often become 
evident at rather late stages of development or during application only. For this 
reason, the principal debate on the risks and benefits of synbio applications in 
the health sector currently focuses on other aspects: on the ecological risks of 
using populations of genetically modified mosquitoes and on issues concerning 
social justice with regard to new procedures for the production of 
pharmaceuticals and vaccines. 
The significance of synbio in the different areas of application is likely to be 
rather different depending on its economic success and societal acceptance – as 
can be observed for the situation of »conventional« genetic engineering in 
green, red or white biotechnology. In this context, special attention will be paid 
to the consumer-sensitive field of flavouring substances and fragrances or other 
ingredients for the food, cosmetics and detergents industry. Though procedures 
of genetic engineering have been applied here partly for a long time already, the 
use of enhanced synbio procedures in this field is likely to experience 
considerably more public awareness and criticism in the future, as it was the 
case last year. 
Safety and security issues of synthetic biology 3. 
Right from the beginning, the scientific and non-scientific debate on synbio has 
always been accompanied by issues of biosecurity and biosafety. As most 
products and procedures of synbio are still at the beginning of their 
development, their potential safety-relevant properties such as toxicity, 
allergenicity, proliferation properties, and ability to survive in the environment 
remain widely unknown. In connection with the debate on the nature and 
novelty of synbio, the debate with regard to »biosafety« focuses, for a long time 
already, on the politically relevant question whether today's and future 
developments will (still) be covered by the current regulations (for 
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pharmaceuticals, novel therapies, medical products, chemicals and, above all, 
for genetically modified organisms [GMO]). In addition, the biosafety debate 
concentrates on whether these developments are covered by the current 
regulations in an adequate way – or whether they go far beyond the scope of the 
categories involved, and current procedures of risk assessment and risk 
management are no longer effective. A second topic area refers to issues of 
biosecurity, i. e. illegal (»biocrime«) or even malicious (»bioterrorism«) use of 
biological agents or of the underlying knowledge. Even if much-debated and 
controversial experiments (particularly with avian influenza viruses) associated 
with the risk of such a misuse did not primarily have their origin in research 
projects on synbio so far, wide-ranging concerns are linked to scenarios of a 
future synthetic biology and have already led to first regulatory efforts. 
Biosafety issues – challenges with regard to 
risk assessment and risk regulation 3.1 
In spring 2015, no immediate need for revising the risk regulation of GMO in 
Germany or Europe with a specific view to »synthetically« modified organisms 
(SMO) could be identified. However, given the dynamic scientific-technological 
development and the differences regarding regulation in the different regions of 
the world, it seems to be quite necessary to deal with the risk regulation of a 
possible future release of SMO in a proactive and more intensive way. 
The central issue for the risk assessment and risk-benefit analysis of future 
SMO is the question on how safety assessment without any substantial 
equivalence to a known donor organism can be performed in such a way that 
the results would be accepted by actors from research, industry and politics as 
well as by civil society organizations and the public/citizens – as a basis for the 
approval of field applications. For plants, this questions arises rather in case of a 
larger »genetic reconstruction« process, whereas for micro-organisms it is raised 
for any type of field application (e. g. open cultivation of micro-algae for biofuel 
production), since they have been used almost exclusively in contained systems 
so far. Interventions in the human intestinal flora or other types of microflora 
(in recent times increasingly researched as a future therapeutic approach) might 
become a highly controversial issue, because regulatory competencies are 
unclear in this field. For instance, the German Genetic Engineering Act 
(»GenTG«) does not refer to the application of genetic engineering in humans 
and thus neither to any constituents of the human microbiome, as long as these 
are inside the human body. 
Dealing again with safety requirements regarding production organisms, 
even in contained systems (»contained use«), might become another major 
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issue. Particularly in view of potential »fully synthetic« organisms that have been 
designed »de novo« to a large extent or that have been subject to massive 
xenobiological modification. Even if these organisms are still far away from 
being ready for application, they have been increasingly put up for discussion in 
early 2015 by some scientists as a supposedly particularly safe option for the 
future. This is due to their fundamental biochemical differences, which are 
assumed to render impossible i. a. the functional gene exchange with natural 
organisms. 
In particular due to the increasing possibilities of genome editing 
procedures, the risk debate on genetically modified insects, or animals in 
general, most likely will gain more and more importance in the years to come. 
In view of the experience made with the approval of transgenic plants, a 
consensual positive risk assessment of genetic interventions in animals – 
particularly those with a high potential to spread such as insects – is very 
unlikely in the EU. 
Biosecurity – protection against misuse 3.2 
Besides the targeted development, production and proliferation of biological 
weapons/warfare agents by official military institutions or, however, by terrorist 
organizations, the deliberate misuse of life science expertise also includes 
criminal activities (e. g. aiming at the illicit manufacture of drugs, doping 
substances and counterfeit medicines). Naturally, only little is known about 
these activities which either are kept secret or are illegal. For this reason, a 
detailed factual debate for assessing the risks of »bioterrorism« and »biocrime« 
(as a consequence of synbio activities, but also in general) actually cannot be 
conducted in public. As a matter of principle, however, questions can be asked 
with regard to a potential misuse of technologies which can be used for social 
benefit, but also deliberately for harmful purposes – so-called »dual-use« 
technologies. In this context, two fundamentally different aspects have to be 
considered: First, the generation of sensitive knowledge – e. g. for synthesizing 
and producing toxic substances, highly pathogenic viruses or resistant bacterial 
pathogens – and, secondly, access to this knowledge as well as to the 
technologies and instruments (laboratory equipment) required for 
implementation. 
The control of an undesired proliferation of knowledge and technologies in 
life sciences is facing major technical, but also conceptual, legal and ethical 
challenges. The latter are due to questions concerning a restriction of the 
constitutionally protected freedom of research as well as of tangible, potentially 
important opportunities for health research and preventive health care. 
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Furthermore, these challenges are linked to questions on whether and how 
knowledge can be passed on selectively to specific groups, and on who could 
and/or should decide on this knowledge and on the selection of the people 
authorized to receive the knowledge. There is consensus that additional 
governance measures are required besides international agreements on arms 
control, legal export restrictions for dual-use goods and technologies, and 
possible other legal provisions – in order to reduce the risk of a potential misuse 
of life science research in general and of synthetic biology in particular. All 
people working with biologically active substances should develop strong 
safety/security awareness. Furthermore, they should know whom they can 
involve in assessing the risk of their projects, without having the feeling of being 
supervised in an inadequate manner (such as it might occur in the United States 
where the Federal Bureau of Investigation [FBI] wants to ensure the preventive 
control of risks regarding biosecurity and i. a. systematically designated liaison 
officers for the do-it-yourself [DIY] biology community). 
In Germany, the dual use issue has been picked up proactively and 
discussed intensively by scientific organizations, non-governmental 
organizations (NGOs) and politics in recent years with a view to so-called »Dual 
Use Research of Concern« (DURC). As a consequence, the German Federal 
Government commissioned the German Ethics Council to work on an opinion 
paper concerning the topic »Biosecurity – Freedom and Responsibility of 
Research«. This paper was presented in May 2014 and is likely to be the 
reference point for the further political debate on the issue in Germany for the 
years to come. The German Ethics Council is calling for adequate legislation 
with regard to DURC. As key topics, the Council further recommends the 
creation of a biosecurity code of conduct for responsible research that should be 
adopted by all public and private research facilities throughout Germany, as well 
as the appointment of a central and interdisciplinary DURC commission which 
has to be informed by all researchers prior to the implementation of DURC 
projects. 
With regard to tangibly reducing the potentials for misuse of gen(om)e 
synthesis – which shall become significantly more efficient, less costly and 
possibly decentralized in the future – a compulsory registration for institutions 
using gene synthesis as well as the registration of DNA synthesizers seems to be 
an option which at least could be tested. Even though risks relating to biocrime 
and bioterrorism are most likely to come from organizations and countries that 
cannot or do not want to be controlled by (supra)national regulations. 
 
 11
Synbio and the public – from non-knowledge 
to active involvement 4. 
For years already, the demand for a broad societal dialog on the risks and 
opportunities of synbio as an element of »good governance« is one of the major 
recommendations in almost all statements or opinions by scientific or political 
bodies. A common diagnosis from research and politics shows that – in the past 
– a systematic debate on the social consequences of scientific-technological 
developments was initiated at a very late stage only. Thus, ethical concerns or 
social requirements of these developments could not be taken into 
consideration in an adequate way. As a consequence, very often products 
already developed or systems already implemented were broadly rejected 
(examples most often mentioned are green biotechnology and nuclear energy). 
In response, technology assessment (TA) called for a targeted »upstream 
engagement«, i. e. dealing as systematically as possible with the societal 
opportunities and challenges already at early stages of development. Currently, 
synthetic biology is the prime example for such targeted »upstream 
engagement«. Both at the EU level (within the EU Framework Programme for 
Research and Innovation called »Horizon 2020«) and in the member states, 
sometimes very complex processes of public discourse have been initiated as 
novel types of accompanying research and governance with regard to research 
and development (R&D). 
Media coverage, awareness and strategies of 
public communication 4.1 
The report's overview on the press coverage of synbio as well as on the 
awareness and attitudes of the population shows in an exemplary way the 
challenges emerging from public communication on synbio due to the early 
stage. To a very large extent, it is not yet known where development is heading 
and which products will result from it. Media coverage is only sporadic and 
mostly at the occasion of a particularly hyped research success (such as the 
creation of the »synthetic« bacterial cell nicknamed »Synthia« by Craig Venter 
and his team), though the true future significance must remain widely 
unknown. Finally, the general public is hardly aware of the scientific 
development at this early stage and thus would have to be motivated actively to 
deal with the issue. Another aspect to be considered for synbio is that its 
definition is fairly unclear, so that different actors have a quite different 
understanding of the topic they shall discuss. As a consequence, it is rather 
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difficult to develop strategies and frameworks for public communication of 
synbio. 
Promoting discourse and new governance 
models of synbio 4.2 
Current discourse activities in the Netherlands, the UK, in Germany and within 
the framework of EU projects that are presented in the report represent efforts 
made in order to reach at least some groups of the public. Furthermore, they 
aim to enable an involvement of society in terms of a joint and responsible 
development as well as use of science and technology. These activities represent 
an element of research policy and in part are closely linked to tangible research 
policy agendas (so-called roadmaps). For several years now, particularly the 
European Commission has been promoting systematic reflection and 
participation processes as a new type of governance of R&D processes (for 
synbio specifically by the current SYNENERGENE project) under the title 
»Responsible Research and Innovation« (RRI). 
It is not clear yet whether this might actually result in a new type of 
discourse – one that can involve society as a whole – on the development of new 
technologies in general and synbio in particular. RRI activities themselves have 
to be considered as a kind of experiment or learning process. The corresponding 
projects are deeply rooted in (participatory) TA activities as an almost 
»classical« type of accompanying research. It is particularly unclear whether and 
to what extent public discourse activities actually affect R&D processes of synbio 
in public and private research institutions – rather than only having an effect on 
accompanying research itself. 
With regard to the further design of discourse activities, realistic objectives 
should be defined at an early stage and communicated in a transparent way. In 
this context, particularly the understanding and quality of participation must be 
well-founded in order to prevent disappointment of the parties involved. The 
great efforts required for ambitious participatory projects and the ambivalent 
experience with previous activities, however, are opposed to an extension of the 
offers regarding direct participation. Instead, it may be appropriate to indirectly 
increase the public's interest for synbio in general and for the influence of 
society on its development. For this purpose, science journalism could be 
promoted and supported in its efforts to achieve a high-quality and professional 
media coverage regarding developments of synthetic biology (and other relevant 
new technologies). Moreover, societal actors, such as civil society organizations 
in particular, but also DIY biologists, might be supported in their role as 
discourse participants through appropriate funding measures. 
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DIY bio(techno)logy – actors and perspectives 5. 
While funding of public discourse activities by research policy bodies, at least 
originally, is guided by a top-down engagement, the do-it-yourself (DIY) 
biology community is a bottom-up movement. By definition, it represents an 
active involvement of actors outside the conventional research and innovation 
system. Besides interested non-experts and do-it-yourselfers, this heterogeneous 
community particularly includes visual artists as well as scientifically educated 
protagonists (focusing on life sciences and information sciences). So far, 
however, the significance of the DIY biology or biohacking community for 
synbio hardly results from the development of innovative project ideas or even 
from tangible research projects, as mostly the technical capacities and 
possibilities are still rather limited. However, there are at least three major 
reasons to examine the phenomenon in a more detailed way in the context of 
the issue of synbio and thus of this report: 
› First, the technological gap might decrease or, in some respects, even 
disappear. At the latest when the major objective – or the vision – of synbio 
in the narrow sense will become reality, namely the digital modeling and 
automated production of synthetic organisms. 
› Second, already now, DIY biology provides fresh input for the debate on 
perspectives of synbio (in the broad sense), its usefulness for and desirability 
in society, as well as on the public's demand for real participation in the 
research and innovation process. 
› Third, voices have repeatedly been raised classifying DIY biology to be an 
undesired form of citizen science due to safety concerns, though most 
experts consider those concerns – particularly with regard to biocrime or 
even bioterrorism potentials – to be rather exaggerated. 
Developments so far 5.1 
»Hacking« means releasing objects or even ideas from their original context and 
giving them a completely new function. In industrialized countries, this often is 
a rather artistic and playful way of dealing with technology, whereas the 
approach can provide tangible solutions (called »Jugaad«) for everyday life in 
developing countries. One of the core issues of biohackers is to provide access 
for basically everyone to knowledge, materials and methods of life sciences. 
The first phase of DIY biology dates back to the early 1990s and was 
characterized by activities of a small group of bioartists. From the year 2000 on, 
a phase of »global networking« followed during which mainly scientists and 
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students started to exchange their ideas via the Internet. By the year 2008, non-
commercially operated biohacker spaces were set up as semi-publicly usable 
bio-laboratories in large metropolitan areas of industrialized and newly 
industrialized countries worldwide. The work performed there is dealing with 
art, education, social criticism, technological innovation and scenarios of the 
future. These biohacker spaces offer their members and visitors the option to 
learn and to use molecular-biological techniques on their own without 
depending on schools and universities. The increasing technological 
emancipation of the DIY biology community as well as its media coverage 
stimulated a critical debate on societal issues. So far, efforts to introduce own 
ethical rules in form of so-called »Codes of Ethics« are limited in their scope due 
to the heterogeneity of the international biohacker community. 
In recent years, an increasing commercialization can be observed resulting in 
several start-up companies. Some of the development projects announced in 
this context, e. g. for the production of auto-luminescent plants, provoked sharp 
criticism both among NGOs critical of genetic engineering and within the DIY 
biology community itself. The activities in the DIY biology community also 
raised fears among some biosecurity experts (mainly in the US): biohackers 
might harm the environment or humans by making errors (»bioerror«), by 
knowingly or unknowingly committing criminal acts (»biocrime«) or even by 
conducting bioterrorist activities. In recent years, however, these fears have been 
strongly put into perspective after a detailed analysis of the situation. 
Future prospects and scenarios 5.2 
DIY biology likely will become significantly more powerful in the future as a 
consequence of further technological developments – primarily concerning the 
automation, decentralization, miniaturization and price reduction of DNA 
synthesis and lab-on-a-chip technologies. As a result, more and more questions 
are asked already today within the DIY biology community itself regarding 
biosafety, freedom of research and common welfare-oriented economic use. In 
this context, the TAB report presents considerations regarding a so-called »Bio-
Commons concept« devised within the European biohacker community. It 
comprises considerations on the necessity and possibilities of monitoring and 
controlling genetic data, both in order to prevent risky applications and to 
promote a distribution as open as possible of the molecular-biological and 
(bio)technological knowledge. The latter shall ensure a globally fair and 
sustainable use of the potentials of synbio. The approach proposes a 
fundamental reform regarding the protection of intellectual property in life 
sciences, so that claims for protection can be acquired non-bureaucratically and 
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at a reasonable price for a rather short period of time (a few years). 
Furthermore, they can be combined with share-alike conditions similar to the 
Creative Commons licenses based on copyright. Finally, a limited deregulation 
of gene sequences or organisms considered to be safe or free of risk is put up for 
discussion, building on the already existing legal scope (i. a. for self-cloning) and 
practices (in schools and universities). 
The DIY biology community could play an important role for the 
communication and the critical debate of the life sciences as well as in research 
on their possible consequences. Committed citizens, hackerspaces and more 
open academic structures provide an opportunity to open up application-
oriented research increasingly for an effective societal dialogue. 
Future issues and fields of action 6. 
A resumptive consideration regarding the question for the novelty value and 
social relevance of synbio as well as for political responsibilities is the starting 
point for describing the fields and options for action involved. While synbio in 
the narrow sense is unlikely to gain major practical significance in the 
foreseeable future, the debate on synbio in the broad sense (as a synonym for the 
next level of biotechnology and genetic engineering) is likely to be conducted 
much more intensively in the years to come. Main reasons are genome editing 
techniques which have not been dealt with under the label of synbio so far. The 
enlarged groups of actors (such as the DIY community, but also the participants 
of the iGEM student competition) and the increased demands on societal 
participation that have emerged in recent years are likely to provide fresh 
impetus. Altogether, the results of the present report provide six different fields 
of action or thematic areas primarily for research policy, but in part also for 
environmental and economic policy. 
Funding of basic and applied research and 
development projects 6.1 
The most important principle of public R&D funding should be to broaden 
available options and to keep them open. This prohibits a premature 
commitment to specific technologies or processes – particularly in view of the 
complex challenges inherent to a global sustainable bio-economy. While the 
potential short- and medium-term applications should result from synbio in the 
broad sense, the future potential of synbio in the narrow sense is difficult to 
predict. For this reason, specific funding for the development of »fully 
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synthetic« – or at least xenobiological – organisms beyond basic research is 
currently hardly justifiable. It thus seems appropriate that, so far, the German 
Federal Ministry of Education and Research (»BMBF«) largely avoids the 
strategic use of the term »synbio«, but, at the same time, promotes manifold 
new methods of biotechnology and genetic engineering in different funding 
lines. This is in keeping with the more open concept of synbio in the broad 
sense and seems to be worth pursuing in the future as well. 
Though still neglected too often, a further point of reference for the 
development of potentially controversial technologies, such as synbio as the 
next level of biotechnology and genetic engineering, meanwhile should be a 
matter of course: moving away from an isolated consideration of technology 
potentials towards a comprehensive and solution-oriented assessment of 
options. In this context, the involvement of societal stakeholders from outside 
the science system or the classical innovation system is of particular importance. 
These stakeholders could bring in their expertise and everyday knowledge, e. g. 
on agriculture or health care issues, which cannot be provided by scientific 
approaches and analyses alone. 
Prospective biosafety research as a basis for future 
risk assessment and regulation 6.2 
On the one hand, most international experts agree on the fact that the existing 
procedures of risk assessment will be sufficient for dealing with products of 
synbio (in the broad sense) in the years to come. On the other hand, however, it 
is pointed out for some years already that the procedure used so far – based on a 
case-by-case examination and on the comparison with largely similar 
(substantially equivalent) organisms which have been used for a long time 
already (i.e. which are »familiar«) – is put into question by several scientific and 
technological developments of synbio. This results in the central question on to 
what extent and by which methods substantially modified or largely 
»redesigned« organisms that may proliferate and spread can be and must be 
characterized – with a view to a societally acceptable decision-making process 
regarding the use of these organisms. 
It seems to be almost urgent that the German Federal Ministry of Education 
and Research (»BMBF«) – together with the other Federal ministries concerned, 
i. e. the German Federal Ministry for the Environment, Nature Conservation, 
Building and Nuclear Safety (»BMUB«) and the German Federal Ministry of 
Food and Agriculture (»BMEL«) – will deal with the topic of biosafety research 
again, after this topic has been funded only within the framework of European 
projects since 2012. This assessment of the situation takes into account first 
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examinations during the past years concerning risk assessment of genetically 
modified plants (GMP) with substantially modified properties (e. g. regarding 
their biochemical composition or their drought or salt tolerance) and the 
advancing possibilities of synbio in the broad sense, primarily of the genome 
editing techniques. 
The controversial nature of questions dealing with the approval of GMP 
and of biosafety research as a basis for future risk assessment and regulation is 
even increased since (when this report went to press) some genetic engineering 
applications is not (or no longer) covered by risk regulation, and thus by safety 
evaluation, in the EU and in Germany. This is because only few letters of the 
genetic code in the DNA are altered. At the same time, however, multiple such 
small changes might result in substantially modified GMP. 
In order to be able to develop a research policy agenda for a prospective 
biosafety research with regard to synbio in the broad sense, it seems to be 
indispensable to reinvestigate the existing unresolved controversies concerning 
the risk assessment of »conventional« GMO. Furthermore, an attempt to a 
comprehensive and discursive evaluation regarding the weak points and 
controversial issues of risk research should be made. In this context, it may not 
be expected that the controversial issues will be resolved; rather the objective 
should be to improve communication between the different actors with regard 
to the (still) open questions in biosafety research on GMO. In order to increase 
the chances of success of such a process, the objectives set should be as realistic 
and precise as possible. Moreover, negative experience and insights from earlier 
attempts at achieving consensus should be evaluated and taken into 
consideration. 
The relevant issues in the risk assessment of GMO are only partly linked to 
scientific aspects. Therefore, a future biosafety research programme would also 
have to be oriented towards social and economic sciences, law and the 
humanities, conceived on the long term and across policy areas. In addition, it 
would need to offer opportunities for true participation, allowing to bring in the 
competencies and interests of all relevant societal stakeholders. The 
coordination of such a process for developing a research programme would 
have to be carried out by an institution or a (steering) body which should be 
recognized as being neutral and fair by as many actors involved as possible. 
In this context, financing will be a major issue. It needs to be evaluated 
whether the private sector in terms of industry associations, insurance 
companies or investor networks would or should pay into a corresponding 
fund. A first tangible step would be the organization of an exploratory 
conference by the responsible ministries with a broader participation of relevant 
groups from society. 
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Involving stakeholders and the broad public in the 
design of research agendas for synbio 6.3 
When it comes to defining the orientation of research areas and agendas, the 
involvement of stakeholders from society outside the (traditional) science 
system is becoming a key element of increasing significance in European and 
German research policy. In the field of research funding oriented towards 
benefits and options, but also with a view to future funding programmes for 
research into the risks or safety of synbio, the involvement of representatives 
from (critical) civil society organizations is of particular importance. 
Large scientific organizations and institutions including academies, but also 
large societal actors like trade unions and churches as well as the private sector 
are usually able to rather easily participate in the development of research 
agendas, by organizing support in terms of personnel and know-how. Yet this is 
significantly more difficult for organizations from civil society dealing with 
environmental, developmental or social issues, as they often have only few paid 
employees the work of whom is financed to a large extent by means of 
membership fees. For this reason, demands made for quite some time now 
saying that research policy should make available funds not only sporadically, 
but with a long-term commitment regarding an organized participation of 
representatives from NGOs, seem to be reasonable. 
As regards the promotion and organization of discourse activities in society, 
a direct involvement of as many segments of the public as possible seems to be 
less appropriate than indirect measures, since synbio is still at a rather early 
stage of development. Besides the involvement of stakeholders in research and 
innovation processes, and the analysis and discussion of future scenarios 
(»vision assessment«), the concept of »Responsible Research and Innovation« 
(RRI) provides corresponding methods. These include the support of 
international actors such as science journalists, artists and other science 
communicators. 
Perspectives of an active participation of citizens 
in biotechnological progress in terms of 
citizen science/DIY biology 6.4 
While the participation of individual persons in the discussion or even design of 
research agendas finally can only comprise a small group of people, the different 
forms of citizen science basically offer many people the opportunity to 
participate even in tangible research projects. In recent years, projects of citizen 
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science have been promoted by the German Federal Ministry of Education and 
Research (»BMBF«) in a targeted way. 
In this context, projects in which citizens primarily participate in data 
acquisition (e. g. by counting animal species or making astronomical 
observations) are dominating so far – thus being a kind of »science with 
citizens«. DIY biology represents a more active way of participating and thus 
can be referred to as »science or research by citizens«. So far, the members of the 
very heterogeneous DIY community have different objectives ranging from a 
mere leisure activity, a claim for participation (in the scientific progress and the 
debate on life sciences) based on democratic theory to the development of 
potential business concepts. At least some representatives – due to their 
combination of a certain affinity for biotechnology/genetic engineering and 
social criticism – stand for a new voice in the (still divisive) debate on genetic 
engineering and synthetic biology. 
For research policy, the question is whether a comprehensive involvement 
of society in scientific progress with regard to biotechnology or synbio in the 
broad sense should also include the targeted support of bio-hackerspaces, as it is 
the case to some extent e. g. in France or in the United States. It would also be 
possible to explore the development of »citizens' laboratories« which are more 
closely attached to university or research institutes. In this context, however, it 
would have to be ensured that these laboratories go beyond educational or 
communication measures like the existing »open laboratories« and that they are 
explicitly open for individual ideas of non-professional actors. As is often the 
case, a decisive aspect of this approach would be the financing of those citizens' 
laboratories. Similarly, the time resources of employed scientists from the 
»hosting« institutes would be important to be able to commit themselves to an 
open exchange and experimentation together with the »citizen scientists«, 
without being under the pressure to succeed or to publish. Of course, the 
communication of and compliance with biosafety regulations have to be 
guaranteed. In this context, a moderate further development by slightly 
reducing the requirements on the expert knowledge or professional experience 
of the operator, by defining a biosafety level 0.5 or a whitelist of self-cloning 
could be examined. 
How to deal with biological risks and issues of dual use 6.5 
Dual-use issues are far from being limited to life sciences. They have to be dealt 
with in many areas of research. In this respect, activities for creating 
interdisciplinary awareness and establishing commissions for ethics in research 
as interdisciplinary points of contact in all German research institutions appear 
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completely reasonable and worth supporting. Corresponding efforts have been 
made i. a. by the German Research Foundation (DFG), the Max Planck Society, 
the Leibniz Association and science academies (e. g. Leopoldina).  
In view of dual-use research projects of concern (DURC), however, the 
question of the necessary competencies of the corresponding bodies for 
assessing specific possibilities of misuse and the degree of obligation for 
participation arises. Since only very few cases appear to exist, the 
recommendation of the German Ethics Council on setting up a central national 
DURC commission seems obvious. This also applies to the proposal for 
enshrining this body in law, because a possible, but exceptional restriction of the 
freedom of research as a fundamental right would require strong legitimization. 
The systematic integration of biosecurity and dual use issues into university 
curricula and other education schemes of the life sciences seems to be at least as 
important. A fundamental problem for researchers dealing with issues 
concerning a potential misuse is the ever decreasing duration of fixed-term 
contracts in universities and other research institutions. On the one hand, the 
researchers' loyalty to the respective institution (and thus their corresponding 
codes of conduct) may not be that strong; on the other hand, the pressure to 
succeed and to publish will increase. The motivation, but also the possibilities of 
individual scientists of more intensively dealing with ethical issues of their own 
research thus will be limited. 
Gen(om)e synthesis may become increasingly decentralized, and possibly 
significantly more efficient and less costly, in the future. In view of such 
scenarios it might be necessary – as a major prerequisite, but also as an 
expectable further development of synbio – to deal with the very difficult 
question as to whether registration and control of devices, their users and 
specific applications (i. e. of the gene sequences produced) should be and can be 
performed. Theoretically, corresponding measures and processes would have to 
be introduced by consensus on a global and nationwide scale. They would have 
to be affordable and must not unnecessarily impede R&D competition in 
science and industry or even make it impossible. 
Sustainable models for the protection and use of 
intellectual property 6.6 
For economic and ethical reasons, the question on how intellectual property 
emerging from modern life sciences can and shall be protected is one of the 
most controversial questions in the debate on genetic engineering. The very 
confusing data situation and debate concerning this issue could not be dealt 
with in depth in the present report. It could only be addressed briefly with 
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regard to some specific aspects of synbio and DIY biology. Thus, with regard to 
future »designed« molecular structures, genes or even organisms, a commercial 
protection may be more plausible for these than for primarily analytical results 
linked to naturally occurring DNA sequences. Moreover, it is a novelty that 
besides the established (bio-)patent law (with all its controversies and pitfalls) 
copyright is being discussed increasingly as a future concept for protection and 
use. These discussions are based on the assumption that the future of synbio will 
head towards designing biological information (mainly DNA, but also other 
molecules or properties of synthetic systems) just like programming software 
codes. 
For research policy, the question is whether (and which types of) funding 
can or should be linked with specified conditions for access and use of the 
results. This question is being discussed intensively in science and politics for 
years, and far beyond the field of life sciences. It is obvious that dealing with 
intellectual property within the framework of an increasingly digital economy 
will remain one of the major challenges for science as well as for economic and 
research policy in the years to come. The development of regulatory models 
which are innovative and realistic in terms of science, economy, society, politics 
and law would be a very challenging and complex task for in-depth technology 
assessment. 
Challenges of the upcoming new debate 
on genetic engineering 6.7 
In spring 2015, the perspectives and potentials of synbio in the narrow sense – 
i. e. the production of cells or organisms developed from scratch and designed 
»de novo« – have still been considered to be a vision of the future. At the same 
time, the situation of synbio in the broad sense (as the next phase of 
biotechnology and genetic engineering) has changed tremendously. In recent 
weeks, the debate on the new opportunities and consequences of genome 
editing techniques has been extended and intensified in such a way that a 
fundamental change of the debate on the further development and use of 
genetic manipulation techniques can be assumed. 
It can be anticipated that the issue of risk assessment without having a 
substantially similar, familiar reference organism will be of greater urgency in 
the foreseeable future if genome editing techniques will be used worldwide for 
an extensive modification of genomes. In this respect, an intensification of 
biosafety research is likely to be indispensable, both at the national level and by 
means of international collaborations. The global dimensions and the 
consequences of this development are difficult to predict in detail. However, it 
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seems to be obvious that, in the years to come, many new questions with regard 
to funding, to socio-economic and ethical evaluation and to the regulation of 
applications of genetic engineering will arise not only for research policy, but 
also for the German Bundestag as legislative authority. Finally, for these 
questions, it does not matter whether the technologies and methods are referred 
to as synthetic biology. The new aspect here is the increased significance of the 
international dimensions of the issues (or corresponding answers/solutions), 
resulting – last but not least – from the grown and ever increasing scientific and 
technological capacities of the newly industrialized countries. For this reason, 
continuous monitoring of the global developments using scientifically valid 
indicators and regular reporting seem to be obvious. 
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